





About the Milken Inst tute

CONTENTS

	Execut ve Summary	
1	Background	
1	Lessons Learned	
3	Conclusion	
4	Introduct on	
4	Background	
5	Highlight Indicators of Success	
5	Facilitate Bidirect onal Dialogue	
	Methodology	
8	Limitat ons	
	Discussion Points and Lessons Learned	
10	Recent Outbreak Experience	
12	Prior Investments and Public-Private-Academic Partnerships	
15	Risk Communicat ons and Community Engagement	
17	Whole-of-Government Approach	
18	Sustained Polit cal Will, Leadership, and Trust	
20) Final Considerat ons	
	Conclusion	
23	Appendix 1: Countries Represented in Interview Phase	
24	Appendix 2: Interview Part cipants	
	Appendix 3: Roundtable Part cipants	
	Endnotes	
	Acknowledgments	
30	About the Authors	

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Much has been writ en about the substant al and troubling def ciencies exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic in the world's ability to respond to major public health crises. We do not aim to restate those def ciencies here. But as we enter the fourth year of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is incumbent on us to cont nue to reflect on our collect ve experience and to urge health-care decision makers and policymakers to apply the lessons of the past three years to prepare for future public health threats.

Building on our respect ve work on lessons learned from COVID-19, Jacobs and FasterCures, a center of the Milken Inst tute, came together to pursue a research study to examine a paradox of COVID-19: Why did some high-income countries that have historically ranked highly on pandemic readiness indices fare relat vely worse in their init al response to COVID-19 than some low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) that have historically ranked lower?

In approaching this work, we acknowledged that a range of factors could be at play in driving dif erent al COVID-19 burden across countries, including dif erences in demographics and in the quality of data collect on systems. While we focus on lessons learned from the experiences of LMICs, further evaluat on of the impact of the pandemic on lives, livelihoods, and economies will certainly need to be conducted.

For this study, we sought to surface the more qualitat ve aspects of internat onal COVID-19 responses, with three object ves in mind:

- highlight indicators of success that may or may not already be captured in current evaluat on tools to assess pandemic preparedness,
- facilitate bidirect onal learning and dialogue among countries in the Global North and in the Global South, and
- share learnings with state- and federal-level policymakers in the US and internat onally.

Through the course of our research, we ident f ed f ve key at ributes that contributt

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- 2. An ef ect ve early warning system is dependent on informed and alert clinicians and health pract t oners who see pat ents face-to-face and are able to recognize anomalous cases even before they can be detected by surveillance systems. The health-care workforce must be trained to detect emerging diseases in order to improve a country's ability to respond in real t me.
- 3. In noncrisis t mes, systems that are ut lized for more rout ne act vit es such as childhood vaccinat on delivery, sent nel surveillance for chronic or endemic disease, or processes for disease report ng, should be designed and maintained to be repurposed during crises. In essence, countries that quickly elevated of ine (cold) or rout ne (warm) systems into surge (hot) systems were able to address COVID-19 more rapidly and ef ect vely.

Prior Investments and Public-Private-Academic Partnerships

- 1. Public health should be priorit zed by governments, and adequate infrastructure and resources must be in place prior to an event so that they can be easily repurposed or scaled up to accommodate the next outbreak. In addit on, it is important to have a mechanism in place that allows f exible access to and reallocat on of funds during t mes of crises. This can be accomplished through a large reserve fund that is easily accessed and dispersed during an emergency. Relatedly, there should be a mechanism to access f nancial resources when needed and reallocate them where necessary or triggered by predef ned thresholds.
- 2. Public-Private-Academic Partnerships (PPAPs) are crit cal for pandemic preparedness and response. Where nonexistent, there must be new mechanisms and legislat on that support these mult faceted partnerships between the public, private, academic, and civil sectors to respond to any threat in public health. Mechanisms should account for reorientat on of the workforce to f II crit cal workforce gaps during crises.
- 3. To ensure investments and PPAPs funct on as planned during crises, af er-act on reports should be t mely, and countries should regularly train and perform tabletop exercises to enhance each partner's understanding of and performance in their role as well as to ident fy opportunit es to improve capabilit es.
- Risk communicat on is most ef ect ve when coupled with just f cat on, backed by scient f c rat onale, and locally relevant. Risk communicat on should be tailored for af ected populat ons by considering their needs, beliefs, culture, and other relevant factors. Communicat ons are most ef ect ve when ut lizing established and trusted channels to share informat on with communit es, such as technical experts, religious leaders, community health workers, and social inf uencers.
- 2. It is important to develop systems to detect disinformat on. Such systems would monitor informat on at the local level and enable the development of targeted communicat ons and engagement strategies to counter inaccurate messages.

3. Community engagement should start at the local level and work from the bot om up. It is imperat ve to develop trust ng partnerships with the community by engaging members frequently and transparently especially in noncrisis t mes. This could be achieved by establishing a network of task forces from the regional to the local levels to deliver risk messaging and develop standard operat ng procedures to address health events.

Whole-of-Government Approach ⊕y07)@pDD@m 100P@znvm 27uymottoot70;@

INTRODUCTION

As of the end of 2022, 6.7 million lives have been lost to COVID-19. This staggering death toll compels us to scrut nize our systems and processes for pandemic preparedness and response cont nually. With experts already predict ng the next pandemic may be worse than COVID-19, we must take urgent act on to strengthen our collect ve ability to confront future public health crises.

With this in mind, FasterCures, a center of the Milken Inst tute, has brought together a network of global experts in health, f nance, data, and technology over the past three years to ident fy the areas in which investment may be most impact ul in prevent ng future pandemics. This work led to a call for a globally coordinated early warning system that would have the capabilit es to detect emerging pathogens and generate insights that can support outbreak response and decision-making. A vision and key considerat ons for such a system are captured in two Inst tute reports: <u>A Global Early Warning System for Pandemics: Mobilizing Surveillance for Emerging</u> Pathogens and A Global Early Warning System for Pandemics: A Blueprint for Coordinat on.

Likewise, Jacobs heavily collaborates with its partners to create and maintain resilient health systems, including health infrastructure, operat ons, and governance components. During the COVID-19 pandemic, infrastructure and operat ons projects included rapidly convert ng medical centers to respond to pat ent surge, retroft ng manufacturing facilities to support vaccine product on, planning and building test ng sites, performing public transport network analysis for response, and developing a model to predict transmission rates under various operating scenarios. Health governance projects during the pandemic included supporting national biosafety and biosecurity legislat on development in Liberia, Guinea, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Ukraine; conducting a pandemic preparedness all-hazards needs assessment for Mercy Health System; and designing wastewater surveillance systems in the Middle East. Through these highlighted projects and global partnerships, Jacobs observed life-saving ingenuity and innovat ve approaches to pandemic preparedness. Further, it documented lessons learned during the pandemic in a panel session t tled "Success At ributes from Past Epidemics and Pandemics—What Can Global North Learn from Global South?" during the Global Health Security Conference in Singapore in June 2022.

Building on this previous work on lessons learned, Jacobs and FasterCures came together

income countries (LMICs), further evaluat on of the impact of the pandemic on lives, livelihoods, and economies needs to be conducted.

Through this study, we sought to surface the more qualitat ve aspects of internat onal COVID-19 responses, with three object ves in mind:

1.

Between July and December 2022, FasterCures and Jacobs interviewed nearly 30 internat onal stakeholders across 18 countries (Appendixes 1 and 2). We targeted countries based on a qualitat ve evaluat on of their success during the pandemic and COVID-19-related morbidity and mortality rates. We selected interviewees based on their public health expert se and involvement in pandemic mit gat on or overall preparedness act vit es. We include anonymous quotes from interviewees throughout this report.

Jacobs and Milken Inst tute (2023)

Pillar	Descript on	Factors
Overarching	Factors not otherwise considered or highlighted in exist ng resilience or GHS frameworks that may have signif cant, but not necessarily quant f able, impact in pandemic, epidemic, and outbreak management	Inf uence of Public-Private- Academic Partnerships Localizat on of Capabilit es Recent Outbreak Management
Governance	Ef ect ve and part cipatory leadership with strong vision and communicat on, coordinat on of act vit es across government and key stakeholders, an organizat onal learning culture that is responsive to crises, ef ect ve informat on systems and f ows, and surveillance enabling t mely detect on of shocks and their impact	Polit cal Will Trust in Health Of cials Mult sectoral Collaborat on Communicat ons Engagement Early Warning Systems
Financing	Suf cient monetary resources in the system and f exibility to reallocate and inject extra funds, ensuring stability of health system funding through countercyclical health f nancing mechanisms and reserves, purchasing f exibility and reallocat on of funding to meet changing needs, and comprehensive health coverage	Health Coverage Long Investments Flexible Access Crisis Funds
Resources	Appropriate level and distribut on of human and physical resources, ability to increase capacity to cope with a sudden surge in demand, and mot vated and well-supported workforce	Crit cal Infrastructure Workforce Surge Capacity Equity
Service Delivery	Alternat ve and f exible approaches to deliver care	Basic Services Maintained Flexible Delivery (e.g., Telehealth)

Jacobs and Milken Inst tute (2023)

Limitat ons

Because of the limited scope and accelerated t meline associated with this study, there are limitat ons to our research that could be addressed in future ef orts. First, the study did not include a full academic literature review of pandemic successes; thus, there are likely addit onal success at ributes beyond what we ident fy in this report. Similarly, our interviewees and associated countries do not represent a stat st cally signif cant sample size nor a comprehensive "all country" review, which necessarily implies gaps in our f ndings. In addit on, the informat on we present may be skewed based on over- or under-representat on of part cular domains or backgrounds of those on our interviewee list; for example, some pillars such as service delivery or factors such as equity were simply not discussed at length because that expert se and experience were not fully represented among the people we interviewed. Likewise, our interviewees skewed toward industry, academia, and mult laterals, with limited representat on from government ent t es. Therefore, not all viewpoints are represented equally. Despite these limitat ons, we present our discussion points and learnings as a start ng point for further discussion and invest gat on.


Although we confirmed the well-studied understanding that core capacities such as trained epidemiologists and laboratory networks are critical for pandemic prevention, detection, response, and recovery, we uncovered several additional, somewhat qualitative, at ributes that contributed to initial successes in some countries in the Global South. These qualitative at ributes primarily fall under our framework's governance pillar and were discussed by many part cipants as key enhancers of their existing core capacities. Indeed, these factors enabled active utilization of the core capacities that were in existence, something that was not necessarily seen consistently in countries with strong core capacities during COVID-19.

As noted in Figure 2, the success at ributes include (1) recent outbreak or epidemic experience that spurred immediate act on and understanding of the threat when early warnings were sounded; (2) ability to leverage exist ng or nascent investments and public-private-academic partnerships at the t me of need; (3) strong community engagement, risk communicat ons, and equitable approach that targets, and includes, local communit es; (4) a willingness to employ a whole-of-government approach; and (5) the combinat on of sustained polit cal will, strong leadership, and trust in public inst tut ons.

Interviewees frequently discussed how recent experience managing past outbreaks or epidemics greatly impacted their country's ability to respond to COVID-19 quickly. Moreover, recent experience (whether good or bad) inf uenced a country's percept on and understanding of the threat when internat onal warnings were sounded.

Countries with a history of responding to outbreaks already have necessary outbreak response infrastructure and frameworks in place. For example, countries used Ebola, polio, and avian inf uenza Emergency Operat on Centers and rapid response teams to cover COVID-19related act vit es. Furthermore, countries with strong rout ne vaccinat on systems, developed in response to past outbreaks, were able to repurpose those systems during COVID for other act vit es, including distribut on of vaccines. Being able to quickly mobilize exist ng tools, workforce, and materials used to f ght previous outbreaks is a signif cant factor for success. Certain countries described themselves as being "pandemic aware." Past outbreaks have provided policymakers with lessons learned and helped to ident fy areas that need development and strengthening. Outcomes of previous learnings consist of nat onal response plans, risk

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The COVID-19 response showcased the benef ts of invest ng in research and science, as well as in public health infrastructure and workforce. In addit on, public-private-academic partnerships (PPAPs) contributed to many countries' pandemic preparedness and response. For this study, we ut lized several exist ng def nit ons of PPAPs to broadly evaluate partnerships of any form that contributes to outbreak and pandemic detect on and response.

Prior investments in fundamental resources are crit cal when dealing with a crisis surge. Adequate public health f nancing and access to addit onal funding during crises are directly linked to posit ve response outcomes. Governments with prior experience managing outbreaks appreciate the importance of preparedness and are willing to allocate funds and resources in ant cipat on of the next event. Past outbreaks have pushed certain af ected countries to set public health f nancing as a top priority.

The interviews we conducted highlight the need to invest in applied science, surveillance methods, crit cal infrastructure, and human resource development—resources that cannot be purchased or developed rapidly in the face of a crisis. Intervent ons such as community engagement and communicat ons must not be overlooked either.

In mult ple cases during the COVID-19 pandemic, preexist ng infrastructure was repurposed to supplement the pandemic response. For example, exhibit on arenas were converted into community care facilit es for less severe cases to relieve the hospital surge. Hotels were repurposed as quarant ne facilit es, and the workforce was reoriented. Hotel recept onists possess the required skills to be ef ect ve contact tracers, and they were trained for contact tracing ef orts. To combat supply-chain issues, countries focused ef orts on localizing capabilit es through state-owned enterprises; in one example, 3D printers were used to make swabs and masks within country. All of these successes were possible due to the willingness of the governments, industry, and academic inst tut ons to work together toward a collect ve solut on.



Government should priorit ze public health and put in place adequate infrastructure and resources prior to an event so that they can be easily repurposed or scaled up to accommodate the next outbreak. In addit on, it is important to have a mechanism in place that allows f exible access to and reallocat on of funds during t mes of crises. This can be accomplished through a large reserve fund that is easily accessed and dispersed during an emergency. Relatedly, there should be a mechanism to access f nancial resources when needed and reallocate where necessary or triggered by predef ned thresholds.

PPAPs are crit cal for pandemic preparedness and response. Where nonexistent, there must be new mechanisms and legislat on that support these mult faceted partnerships among the public, private, academic, and civil sectors to respond to any threat in public health. Mechanisms should account for reorientat on of the workforce to f II crit cal workforce gaps during crises.

To ensure investments and PPAPs funct on as planned during crises, af er-act on reports should be t mely, and countries should regularly train and perform tabletop exercises to enhance each partner's understanding of and performance in their role as well as to ident fy opportunit es to improve capabilit es.

informat on exchange are helpful in this process and local communit es play a crit cal role. For example, a rumor management system where community members monitor local conversat ons, via a call center or social media plat orms, help public health leaders understand the misconcept ons circulat ng in the communit es and ident fy crit cal informat on gaps.

While we were unable to examine the full impact of equity during this study, we found that countries that priorit zed an equitable approach to community engagement and countermeasures had a larger perceived impact on all segments of the populat on. Where countermeasures were targeted to local context, our interviewees noted higher compliance and understanding of the threat. Equity in pandemic preparedness, response, and recovery will need to be studied further.

Risk communicat on is most ef ect ve when coupled with just f cat on, backed by scient f c rat onale, and locally relevant. Risk communicat on should be tailored for af ected populat ons by considering their needs, beliefs, culture, and other relevant factors. Communicat ons are most ef ect ve when ut lizing established and trusted channels to share informat on with communit es, such as technical experts, religious leaders, community health workers, and social inf uencers.

It is important to develop systems to detect disinformat on. Such systems would monitor informat on at the local level and enable the development of targeted communicat ons and engagement strategies to counter inaccurate messages.

Community engagement should start at the local level and work from the bot om up. It is imperat ve to develop trust ng partnerships with the community by engaging members frequently and transparently especially in noncrisis t mes. This could be achieved by establishing a network of task forces from the regional to the local levels to deliver risk messaging and develop standard operat ng procedures to address health events.



Pandemic response requires a whole-of-government approach which, in many of the countries we included in our interviews, was accomplished through the format on of an intragovernmental task force or steering commit ee. The main funct ons of these task forces and steering commit ees were to provide a coordinated approach to pandemic response, communicate with stakeholders, provide guidance on public health measures, and allocate resources.

In the majority of countries that employed a whole-of-government approach, the main health agency led task forces that convened various government agencies and other organizat ons in

Trust in public health and science cannot be built over a short period of t me and should be a consistent priority before, dus p

CONSIDERATIONS

In addit on to core competencies, we ident f ed several success at ributes through our Global South to Global North conversat on. By looking at success through a dif erent lens, we can ident fy what might be a key combinat on of factors to enhance core capacit es. However, what do we do with such informat on, and what comes next?

At a high level, it is important to note that none of these at ributes, or combinat ons thereof, is simple to develop. Certainly, through our conversat ons we found wide variability in the intent onality of having one or more of a specific at ribute; a country could have achieved such an at ribute by design A conv int e cs nat o tt bQ es, oru fg oa Ri oC mf p e I s,r qeBnQ The crit cal importance and success of **Prior Investments and PPAPs** during the COVID-19 pandemic have been discussed widely; however, we point out that future, long-term investments and PPAPs must employ sustainable approaches, such as task forces, commit ees, and in-kind partnerships among government and scient sts. It may be necessary for countries and/or states to perform a sustainability analysis of COVID-19-related PPAPs and investments.

It is clear that **Recent Experience** had a signif cant impact on a country's percept on of threat and willingness to act. A potent al approach to replicat ng this success factor is ensuring consistent tabletop and f eld training and exercises; however, it will be important to sustain momentum and ensure that the right people are involved. As such, it may require analysis of pre-COVID-19 pandemic plans against the COVID-19 reality to ensure the ident f cat on of gaps in human resources or future plans. In addit on, where it is not already, training and exercises should be their own indicator within relevant GHS frameworks. As the world cont nues to emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic and adjusts to a heightened awareness of pandemics and their impact, we urge health decision makers and stakeholders to:

employ an intent onal design approach to incorporate lessons learned into future pandemic preparedness roadmaps and frameworks at the internat onal, nat onal/federal, and regional/ state levels;

priorit ze and build out PPAPs during noncrisis t mes, which will allow trust and relat onships to be formed well in advance of health events;

involve communit es and diverse groups in the dialogue (response act ons and preparedness act vit es should be designed together with target groups and/or communit es);

maintain bidirect onal dialogue and ongoing learning to promote alignment of the global health community in defining next steps af er COVID-19; and

cont nue support ng f nancial mechanisms that can provide emergency preparedness funds and resources for health crisis events.

APPENDIX 1: COUNTRIES REPRESENTED IN INTERVIEW PHASE







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Agency	Part cipant



We sincerely thank all the part cipat ng interviewees and roundtable stakeholders for their suggest ons and lessons learned summarized in this report. Your insight ul feedback and discussions are invaluable to the success of this project.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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Leah Goodman is a consultant for Jacobs, where she supports all global health act vit es. Goodman earned her graduate degree in biohazardous threat agents and emerging infect ous diseases from Georgetown University. Relevant coursework focused on biosafety and biosecurity, policy, and pandemic management. Her studies highlighted research and analysis as well as the Defense Threat Reduct on Agency's Cooperat ve Threat Reduct on (CTR) and Biological Threat Reduct on Program (BTRP). In conclusion of her studies, Goodman completed a thorough policy analysis focusing on the CTR Program's ability to counter disinformat on surrounding BTRP and provided recommendat ons to improve communicat on.

Nino Kharaishvili, **MD**, is Jacobs' global health director for health system governance, where she focuses on health system resilience and preparedness. As an internat onal health professional, she has working knowledge of 40 dif erent countries across the former Soviet Union, Africa, Southeast Asi





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